The recent inauguration of Montreal city hall marks the end of a project almost twice as long and more expensive than expected. This is far from being a unique case in Montreal, where major projects are regularly victims of major overruns.

Implementation of a wastewater ozonation plant: four times longer and four times more expensive than when it was announced in 2008. Development of two compost treatment plants: twice as expensive as the budget planned to build five installations of the same type in 2010. Construction of the Bellechasse bus garage: twice as long and twice as expensive as announced in 2018.

“The common point between all of these projects is that they are unique and complex projects,” defended Émilie Thuillier, responsible for infrastructure on Mayor Valérie Plante’s executive committee, in a telephone interview. “This is where we arrive with certain cost overruns and especially certain schedule overruns. And as soon as we miss the deadline, the costs increase. It’s a rule of three. »

She added that in some cases, projects were modified in depth between the publication of a first estimate and completion.

“It’s certain that the pandemic hurt, but it doesn’t explain everything,” she continued, also citing inflation and “the overheating of the construction market.” According to the elected official, the City of Montreal does not suffer from any management problems with its major projects.

The official opposition at city hall does not hear it the same way.

“There is a planning problem and there is a monitoring problem, absolutely,” argued opposition leader Aref Salem. “It’s as if public money had no limit. They are going all out, without respecting Montrealers’ ability to pay. They have no awareness of the value of money. »

It’s not just large projects worth more than a hundred million dollars that are suffering from problems.

La Presse has learned that the inauguration of the Sanaaq Cultural Center, a library and venue planned for the city center, has been postponed again by the City of Montreal. The opening “is now planned for the summer of 2025 after construction site conditions caused the work to be delayed,” indicated public relations specialist Hugo Bourgoin. In addition to the $36 million work (nearly three times more expensive than expected), since January 2022, Montreal has been paying rent of more than $100,000 per month to real estate developer Devimco for this space.

The Montreal Insectarium also continues to cost the municipal treasury dearly despite its inauguration in 2022 after a $38 million project (an increase of 39%).

Sections of the greenhouse-like building were overheating, a problem the administration hoped it could fix permanently for $850,000. At the beginning of June, the contract for the remedial works was finally concluded for 3.5 million. The general contractor is also claiming an additional 8 million. Montreal says it is considering its legal options.

“The vast majority of projects fall into costs and schedules,” however assured Émilie Thuillier. “Afterwards, there are a few projects that stand out from the crowd and these are obviously the projects that make the media. » The elected official even argues that on average, the costs of the work correspond almost exactly to the estimates made by officials of the City of Montreal.

According to Gabriel Jobidon, professor specializing in public procurement at the École de Technologie Supérieure (ETS), two factors can explain the immense gap between the planned bill and the actual bill in certain municipal projects.

First, the way public contracts are awarded – to the lowest compliant bidder – is not compatible with the current state of the market. The lack of bidders and the significant variations in construction costs are forcing contractors to press harder on their pencils, he says.

Émilie Thuillier agrees with him. “If we leave all the risks to the private sector in our call for tenders, they will include all the risks in their prices and will make us pay for them, even if the risks do not materialize,” she said. The elected official also asked the government of Quebec to grant the City of Montreal the right to conclude similar agreements.

Second element, in Mr. Jobidon’s opinion: in many public organizations, estimates are “poorly communicated” by political leaders. “Often, these are projects that are announced much too early, when the design is not even complete,” he said, clarifying that early estimates (called “class D estimates”) by definition include a margin of error of 40%.

André Lavoie, from the Association of Estimators and Construction Economists of Quebec (AEECQ), also highlighted the importance of calling on certified professionals.

“You have to listen to your professional or your expert,” he argued. “We must never forget that in any major public project, there are always political imperatives: is the figure that is announced the one that the professional experts recommended or did they say to themselves that the figure would not be accepted by the population and that they would increase it later, for example?”

Most of the recent major construction projects of the Société de transport de Montréal (STM) have ended up in court, resulting in several million dollars in legal fees, La Presse has noted.

Côte-Vertu underground garage, SRB Pie-IX, Édifice Crémazie: the contractors who worked on these huge projects linked to public transport have each time demanded large sums, often pleading that the sites were poorly planned.

In the case of the Côte-Vertu underground garage, the STM and a consortium led by the firm EBC found themselves before an arbitration tribunal earlier this year to resolve their dispute. The consortium’s contract was terminated in 2020, after a year behind schedule for the work.

“The legal fees amount to 6 million in this case, ongoing since 2020,” explained Amélie Régis, spokesperson for the STM. “This remains within the parameters of the project authorized by its governance. » This is a half-billion project.

According to our information, the STM recently concluded an agreement with the consortium, agreeing to pay it a sum amounting to millions of dollars. The STM, however, refused to reveal how much public money it paid: “the arbitration process agreed between the parties is confidential, including its resolution,” indicated Ms. Régis.

Civil proceedings are not confidential.

EBC, also responsible for the construction of the SRB Pie-IX, filed a lawsuit for 72 million last December, after the end of the project. She alleges she was the victim of poor planning and “constant” problems with underground infrastructure.

Legal proceedings have been launched against the City of Montreal and the Regional Metropolitan Transport Authority (ARTM), officially responsible for the project. The latter had, however, delegated responsibility for the project to the STM. This lawsuit “does not concern us,” argued communications advisor Amélie Régis, of the STM, by email.

Concerning the Édifice Crémazie, a quarter-billion project, the electromechanical construction firm Lambert Somec is suing the STM for 6 million. “Delays at all phases” of construction cost him dearly, the suit claims. The STM indicated that “in accordance with its contractual obligations, the general contractor took up the cause of the STM in this matter”, avoiding legal fees.

The STM refused to grant an interview on the subject of the judicialization of several of its projects.

“The STM makes a lot of effort to prevent claims and, when they arise, it is diligent in reducing and processing them,” said spokesperson Amélie Régis. “We try every possible way to reduce the risk of litigation. » The organization is also asking for the right to enter into contracts “in collaborative mode” in order to limit the risk of conflicts.

Other smaller projects are also the subject of prosecution. Construction Demathieu