Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced more than a week ago that the Russian offensive launched on May 10 in the Kharkiv region in the north-east had “failed.” His armed forces are now said to have even counterattacked and “driven the enemy out of the region,” Zelensky announced on Monday.
According to Ukrainian sources, 400 Russian soldiers are surrounded in a chemical plant in the contested border town of Vovchansk. The American Institute for War Studies (ISW) reported that, in view of high losses, Moscow is sending new infantry brigades “to replace units that have lost their combat capabilities.”
The border area near Kharkiv is one of several sections of the more than 1,000-kilometer-long front line where Ukraine was able to stabilize the situation after the Russian winter offensive. In Donetsk in particular, on the axis of Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar, the Russian army is still making small gains in territory. But the danger of a deep breakthrough, which observers had feared in the spring, seems to have been averted for the time being.
Kiev can now concentrate again on its strategy of attrition, attacking Russian targets far behind the contact line. Last week, 70 drones attacked the Morozovsk airbase, which lies 180 kilometers behind the Ukrainian border. Ukraine’s 25th Airborne Brigade reports at least six destroyed and eight damaged aircraft. Morozovsk is a hub for Su-34 aircraft that drop the heavy glide bombs that have caused the Ukrainians so much trouble for months.
At the beginning of June, Ukrainian drones are said to have destroyed a Su-57 fighter jet, considered Moscow’s most advanced military aircraft, at the Akhtubinsk base in southern Russia, 600 kilometers from the front line. The focus of the Ukrainian strategy remains the Crimean peninsula, which is occupied by Russia in violation of international law.
A few days ago, American Atacms missiles are said to have taken out S-300 and S-400 air defense systems there. According to reports from the Ukrainian military, a total of 15 Russian air defense systems have been destroyed in Crimea since May. In addition, dozens of rocket launchers, more than 15 radar stations and more than ten command posts are said to have been hit. “The day of the liberation of the Ukrainian Crimea is approaching,” said the military spokesman.
This may sound good and be well received, especially by the domestic public. But it remains unclear whether the destruction of Russian targets behind the lines actually brings “Liberation Day” closer. Because Kyiv’s strategy of attrition has not yet brought the desired result. Even the former Ukrainian Chief of General Staff Valery Zalushny had to admit after the failed counteroffensive in the summer of 2023 that he had misjudged the Russian military.
Despite military setbacks and incredibly high casualties, Russia was not pushed to the brink of defeat. “Russia has learned to adapt,” says Mykola Beleskov, an expert at the National Institute of Strategic Studies of Ukraine and senior analyst at the Ukrainian charity Come Back Alive.
Despite monthly losses of 17,000 dead and wounded, Russia has proven that it can maintain a high level of combat capability along the entire front line. And this is unlikely to change, Beleskov believes, as long as Ukraine does not develop a “realistic strategy for victory,” as he recently explained in an essay. Even after the failed summer offensive, the political scientist emphasizes, there was no discussion about a “future, optimal strategy in the war against Russia.”
It is very important how victory is defined and what a position should look like in possible peace negotiations. It is also about the way Ukraine fights and what contribution the people have to make to achieve this, writes Beleskov. For example, the new mobilization law that came into force on May 18 caught Ukrainian society completely unprepared. The reactions were correspondingly skeptical. Hundreds of amendments to the bill in parliament have already shown that a clear, common strategy is lacking.
Of course, Ukraine’s allies also play a crucial role in developing a strategy for victory. For a long time, it was not clear how the USA and Europe felt about the war. “Ukraine must not lose” was the slogan that was invoked from Berlin to Washington. But in some capitals there was no talk of a “victory” over Russia.
Kiev’s allies were sometimes very hesitant in supplying weapons and determining how and where Ukraine could use them. Precision artillery, tanks, F-16 jets and cruise missiles triggered more and more lengthy discussions, each time losing valuable time. “We are receiving enough weapons not to lose, but not enough to win,” said resigned Ukrainian soldiers at the front.
“If NATO had delivered more quickly and comprehensively, the war would have been different long ago,” is the opinion of security experts. To this day, there is still a hesitation that many find incomprehensible. The refusal of Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) to hand over the Taurus cruise missile to Ukraine is a prime example of this.
The allies were very confident when the Ukrainian counter-offensive began last year. They hoped that it could bring about a change. However, this hope had little to do with reality, as became clear after just a few days. The Ukrainian armed forces were worn down in Russian minefields and, without air support, were at the mercy of Russian artillery.
Western weapons did not play the decisive role expected. Months later, there was an almost doom-and-gloom mood when Russia captured Avdiivka as part of its winter offensive. “Ukraine’s attempted offensive in the summer of 2023 is an example of what happens when political and military imperatives are not in balance,” Beleskov stresses, almost admonishingly. “Ukraine and its allies must reformulate expectations of success.”
The failed counter-offensive has shown, the analyst continued, that rapid maneuvers without adequate support only lead to the opposite results. Instead, the focus over the next year and a half will be on “active defense,” which stabilizes the front and enables attrition tactics.
At the same time, attacks on Russian refineries, defense industry facilities and logistics hubs should continue, said Beleskov. In his opinion, the attacks on Russian air defense systems in particular are likely to present Moscow with an ever-increasing dilemma. What priorities should be set? Protecting military targets or critical national infrastructure?
The seven-month delay in the US security package worth 61 billion dollars has underlined once again how important the allies are for a Ukrainian victory, however defined. The lack of arms and ammunition aid was an important factor in the Russian conquest of several Ukrainian towns and villages. Only when American supplies reached the Ukrainian units were they able to stabilize the front again.
This illustrates how much Ukraine depends on its allies and their strategy. After the negative experiences of the past few months, the NATO countries seem to have moved a little closer together and are more determined to support Ukraine than before.
For the first time, Ukraine was allowed to attack the territory of the Russian Federation in order to defend Kharkiv. This brought new advantages for the Ukrainian armed forces and demonstrated how crucial it would be to expand the attacks to the entire Russian territory. Only the permission to do so is still pending.
“Ukraine’s partners, especially the United States, avoid defining Ukraine’s victory as the defeat of Russian forces on the battlefield and the liberation of all lost territories,” Beleskov said. Instead, they believed that victory would consist in preserving Ukrainian statehood in the territories under its control.
