The first round of new elections for the French National Assembly is scheduled for June 30. President Emmanuel Macron dissolved the assembly on the evening of the European elections in response to the disastrous result of his party and its allies, who were relegated to second place by a long way to the far-right Rassemblement National (RN). A week of hectic negotiations followed, marked by intrigues and twists worthy of a political thriller.
Macron foresaw this chaos, he probably even factored it in. His decision on election night was anything but impulsive. He knew that candidate lists had to be submitted and alliances forged in the shortest possible time. He relied on the discord in French politics, with the traditional parties on the left and right now shadows of their former selves.
Socialists and Republicans are increasingly being infiltrated by extremists, on the right by the RN, on the left by La France Insoumise (LFI). Macron has encouraged this development, it secured his election victory in 2017 and again in 2022. Now it is supposed to save him once again: he embodies the middle, and the French are left with the choice between him and chaos. But everything indicates that Macron has miscalculated.
The chutzpah that brought him to power and has seen him through numerous crises since then suddenly seems presumptuous. Close allies, such as his Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, tried to dissuade him from his plans until the very end. In vain: although Macron had already become a clear burden for his party during the European election campaign, he seems convinced that he can turn fortunes in his favour one last time. He is reminiscent of Bonaparte, who sought a final decision at Waterloo and senselessly sacrificed his soldiers.
Macron has succumbed to a double illusion. With regard to his political opponents, who have been united by the prospect of revenge more quickly than expected. But above all with regard to his fellow citizens. In the current situation in France and the EU, it was apparently inconceivable for Macron and his advisors that voters could help the right-wing or left-wing populists gain a majority. The situation in Ukraine is too serious for that, and France’s economic indicators too unstable. But they are mistaken.
Since the RN’s election victory on Sunday, a dam has noticeably broken. Every evening, French people explain on the news why the RN is an option this time. It is surprising that Berlin has been taken by surprise by the scenario of an RN head of government. Polls have been predicting a defeat for Macron since the beginning of the year, the extent of which also suggested domestic political consequences.
Admittedly, very few people had predicted the announcement of the new election. But it merely accelerates a trend that has been emerging for some time. Last year, Macron only narrowly survived a vote of no confidence. His recent speeches have sounded correspondingly gloomy – in April, for example, when he outlined the future of Europe at the Sorbonne University in Paris. His state visit at the end of May already seemed at times like a farewell.
The fact that Berlin is surprised raises questions. While the consequences of a possible return of Donald Trump have been discussed for months, the precarious situation of the EU’s closest partner seems to have been lost sight of. There are good reasons to believe that an RN presidency from 2027 onwards would have more dramatic consequences for Germany and the EU than the return of Trump.
Nevertheless, the federal government appears to be just as unprepared for a possible RN participation in government as it was for Brexit or Trump’s first victory in 2016. There are two reasons for this. Political debates in Germany and France are fundamentally different, and the way the fringes of the party spectrum are dealt with is completely different.
While in Germany it is common practice to separate the parties into “democratic parties” on the one hand and the AfD on the other, in France it is unthinkable to deny the RN democratic legitimacy. There is an equivalent to the firewall, in France it is the “cordon sanitaire”. However, the dividing line is thematic, not democratic theory.
A second reason for the surprise is the taboo surrounding positions that contradict one’s own convictions. This does not only affect French politics. In Berlin, it is difficult to seriously discuss scenarios in which the EU changes radically and nation states gain in importance. This dogmatism makes it difficult to soberly analyze the parties that represent these positions. And it prevents preparation for scenarios in which they triumph.
Jacob Ross is a Research Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations with a focus on France and German-French relations.
